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Case No. 20170677-SC
INTI IE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
KEYSTONE INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC,
Plain tiff!Appellant,

v.

INSIDE INSURANCE, LLC, SHUMWAY INSURANCE GROUP,
INC.,JONATHAN SHUMWAY, SPENCER SHUMWAY, AND
CABE ATKINSON,
Defendants/Appellees.

Reply Brief of Appellant
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS' INTERPRETATION OF RULE 26 IS A RED
HERRING BECAUSE KEYSTONE DISCLOSED FROM THE
BEGINNING IT WAS SEEKING DAMAGES FOR ITS
COMMISSIONS AND PROFITS OWED UNDER THE OPERATING
AGREEMENT AND IT WAS SEEKING A BUY-OUT OF ITS 25%
INTEREST IN INSIDE
Unable to articulate any actual harm as to the timing of Keystone's damages

disclosure, Defendants request this Court interpret Rule 26 in a manner that
requires a plaintiff, who does not have the information necessary to disclose a
damages computation because such information is in the sole possession of the
defendant, to propound discovery at the beginning of the case and thus compel the
defendant to divulge the information it is withholding. Aple. Br. at 17. Defendants'
interpretation of Rule 26 ignores the plain language of Rule 26. More importantly,
Defendants' interpretation of Rule 26 is a red herring because Keystone disclosed

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

at the beginning of the case it was seeking its commissions and profits owed under
the Operating Agreement and it was seeking a buy-out of its 25% interest in Inside.
Keystone also conducted discovery within the schedule set by the district court and
then disclosed its damages computation as soon as it could, based on the timing
when Defendants finally provided Inside's financial documents.
Keystone did not violate Rule 26 and the district court's conclusion
otherwise is an abuse of discretion and should be reversed. Moreover, the district
court made no findings that Defendants were harmed by the timing of Keystone's
disclosures and instead erroneously concluded that Defendants were harmed by
disclosing the computation through the expert.
A.

Keystone disclosed early in the case its theory of damages.

Despite the record facts, Defendants repeatedly assert they did not
understand Keystone was seeking its commissions and profits under the Operating
Agreement or that Keystone was seeking a buy-out of its 25% interest in Inside,
and had Defendants understood this, they would have issued additional
interrogatories on these subjects or inquired about these issues in fact discovery.
Aple. Br. at

12, 20-21.

These assertions lack credibility and are refuted by the

record.
Keystone disclosed in paragraph 18 of the Complaint that the Operating
Agreement provides Keystone will receive a 90% commission on all new and
renewal business it originates and a 50% profitability share of all Inside's satellite
offices. R.4. Defendants did not dispute this fact in their Answer. R.257. In
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paragraph 65 of the Complaint, Keystone disclosed it was not being paid the
commissions owed under the Operating Agreement and Defendants admitted they
were not paying Keystone the commissions in their Answer. R.13;263. Keystone
vj

repeatedly asserted in the Complaint it was still entitled to its commissions and
profits under the Operating Agreement. R.14-20. Keystone also repeatedly
asserted in the Complaint it was entitled, under the court's general equity powers,
to have Defendants buy-out Keystone's 25% interest in Inside. R.14-17;28.
The Operating Agreement, filed with the Complaint, contained the
"formula" for calculating Keystone's unpaid commissions and profits. The
Operating Agreement establishes Keystone is a 25% owner of Inside, and it
provides "Keystone will receive a 90/10% commission split on all new and renewal
business written by or brought over by Chad Johansson" and "Keystone will receive
50% of the profitability of the satellite offices." R.60.

Defendants admitted that Jonathan, the manager of Inside, was the one
responsible for making sure the commissions were split properly. R.60;2394.
Defendants also showed the court at the beginning of the case they understood
Keystone's theory of damages. At the preliminary injunction hearing held on June
2,

2015, Defendants asserted Keystone was not entitled to an injunction because

Keystone's damages were only money damages based off of the Operating
Agreement. R.2019-20;2978. Defendants acknowledged Keystone was claiming it
was entitled to be paid its 25% interest in Inside and it was also entitled to money
damages for commissions owed under the Operating Agreement. R.3020;3025.
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Defendants further asserted that Keystone's potential damages, if the Operating
Agreement was enforced, would "kill this company" because Keystone would be
entitled to take 90% of its earned commissions. R.3025.
Understanding that Keystone was seeking its commission and profits as
defined under the Operating Agreement and a buy-out of Keystone's 25% interest
in Inside, Defendants served their first discovery requests on August 3, 2015, less
than two months after Defendants filed their Answer. R.310-11;553-59;2929-30.
Notably, these requests included 20 interrogatories to Keystone, the maximum
number of interrogatories allowed under Rule 26(c)(5). R.553-59. Moreover,
Interrogatory No. 4 asked Keystone to identify all facts as to why Keystone asserted
it was "entitled to receive compensation in any form, including commissions,
following the termination of the agency relationship ... between Keystone and
Inside. R.555. Keystone responded it was entitled "to receive commissions as a
member of Inside" pursuant to the Operating Agreement and ''entitled to receive
the compensation as defined as long as it is a member." R.555.
Keystone again informed Defendants in its October 14, 2015 letter that it
could not calculate the commissions owed because it did not have access to the
information necessary to calculate these commissions and the Defendants were the
ones who calculated these commissions. R.2055. Keystone further disclosed again
it was seeking the value of Keystone's 25% interest in Inside as of the date of the
termination. R.2055.
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Defendants knew that Keystone did not have the ability to provide a
damages computation without access to Inside's financial records, because
Defendants removed Johansson from Inside's premises without any notice,
Defendants would not allow Keystone access to its building or its computer
software, nor would Defendants provide Keystone the records requested under
Utah Code § 48-2c-113. R.1331;1612;2021. Moreover, Keystone informed
Defendants both in its response to Defendant's first discovery requests and in the
October 2015 letter that only Defendants had Inside's financial records that would
allow Keystone to compute its damages. R.559;2055.
Defendants also knew the exact amount of unpaid commissions that were
owed to Keystone under the Operating Agreement. Not only was Jonathan the one
responsible for ensuring Keystone received the correct commission split,
Defendants twice admitted to the district court that the 197-page spreadsheet
Defendants provided during discovery was the spreadsheet maintained by Inside
and it reliably calculated Keystone's commissions after April 20, 2015.
R.60;2394;2858;3208;3211-2.
Keystone also disclosed again during depositions that Keystone was entitled
to the unpaid commissions and profits as defined by the Operating Agreement.
R.925;2935-9.
Keystone also disclosed in its expert disclosure and then in its subsequent
expert report, the amount of unpaid commissions owed to Keystone between May
2015 and March 2016 was $67,177, and that the value of Keystone's 25% interest
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in Inside was between $133,228 and $330,718. R.1555;2062;2064;3321;3325.
Inside's expert calculated the value of Inside, and without the controversial and
alleged debt that was the subject of a motion in limine left undecided by the district
court, Inside's expert opined the value was between $567,779 and $603,403,
leaving Keystone's interest to be valued between $141,944.75 and $150,850.75.
R.2535-40;3339;3347-8;3597. Inside's expert also provided a rebuttal to

Keystone's expert report. R.2047-50.
Given these facts, Defendants cannot credibly assert they did not understand
Keystone was seeking as damages its unpaid commissions and profits as defined
in the Operating Agreement and a buy-out of its 25% interest in Inside. Nor can
Defendants credibly assert it would have issued more interrogatories or asked
additional questions during fact discovery, when they expended the maximum
number of interrogatories allowed early in the case and fully understood
Keystone's theory of damages from the beginning.
B.

The district court's conclusion that Defendants were
harmed by the timing of Keystone's disclosures was an
abuse of discretion.

Defendants assert the district court did not presume harm when it stated
"we're all suffering from a lack of creativity, if we can't imagine a set of questions
or other discovery tools that might have been exercised ... had Inside been aware
of the damages calculation," because the district court subsequently stated "there
is clearly harm when a plaintiff engages in this type of conduct and waits until the
twilight hours of fact discovery to engage in any meaningful discovery ... and then
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to provide the calculation in the expert report for the first time." Aple. Br. at 19-20.
The problem with the district court's conclusion and Defendants' assertion is the
court did not make a single evidentiary finding that supports Defendants' were
harmed by the timing of Keystone's disclosures. Moreover, Defendants are still
unable to articulate any harm.
The district court made no evidentiary findings supporting its finding of
harm. R.3104-11. Instead, the district court made conclusions that Defendants
were harmed, concluding "the timing of the damages disclosures had deprived
Inside of its opportunity to conduct discovery" "because facts discovery has
ended." R.3105-6. The district court highlighted the lack of facts supporting its
presumption of harm when it ruled, "I think that we're all suffering from a lack of
creativity, if we can't imagine a set of questions or other discovery tools that might
have been exercised \\Tith respect to the plaintiff, had Inside been aware of the
damages calculation." R.3106.
With no evidentiary finding as to how Defendants were harmed by the
timing of Keystone's damages disclosure, any conclusion by the district court that
Defendants were prejudiced by the timing of Keystone's disclosure was based on
the presumption that Defendants were harmed. In any event, the district court's
conclusion that Defendants were prejudiced by the timing of Keystone's damages
disclosure were clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
Given the facts in section I(a) above, Defendants were aware Keystone was
seeking its commissions and profits as defined in the Operating Agreement and a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

buy-out of its 25% interest in Inside. Defendants were also aware Keystone did not
have Inside's financial records necessary to calculate its damages. Defendants were
also aware that they were the ones that calculated Keystone's commissions and
profits and that they always had these amounts in their possession. Defendants
took advantage of fact discovery, issuing its maximum allotment of

20

interrogatories at the beginning of the case, conducting numerous depositions, and
then obtaining an expert who calculated Keystone's interest in Inside and also
provided a rebuttal report to Keystone's expert report.
These facts are why Defendants and the district court are unable to articulate
a single question or discovery tool that shows Defendants were harmed by the
timing of Keystone's disclosures.
These facts also establish that the district court abused its discretion when it
erroneously concluded that Defendants were harmed by the timing of Keystone's
damages disclosure and when it excluded Keystone's evidence of damages.

C.

Defendants' interpretation of Rule 26 ignores the plain
language of the Rule.

Defendants do not argue against Keystone's analysis of Rule 26 on pages 3742 of the Opening Brief, wherein Keystone asserts the district court failed to read
all subparts of Rule 26 together in finding Keystone violated Rule 26. Instead,
Defendants assert that Keystone misleads this Court when asserting the district
court ruled that Rule 26 required Keystone to propound discovery at the beginning
of the case so that it could fulfill its obligation under Rule 26(a)(1)(C). Aple. Br. at
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16. Curiously, Defendants next assert this Court should interpret Rule 26 in a
manner that requires a plaintiff to propound discovery at the beginning of the case
if the plaintiff does not have the information necessary to disclose its damages
computation. Aple. Br. at 17. In any event, both the district court's and Defendants'
interpretation of Rule 26 ignores the plain language of the Rule.
Defendants' assertion that Keystone is misleading this Court is unfounded.
Even Defendants admit the district court stated Keystone should have
"propound[ed] discovery ... early ... rather than later." Aple. Br. at 16. The district
court found that while "Keystone's damages disclosure are not as late as those of
the plaintiff in Sleepy Holdings, they are nevertheless untimely." R.2027. The
district court further observed that Keystone's October 2015 letter stated it could
not provide a damages calculation "until Keystone could access Inside's financial
information 'either voluntarily from your clients or through discovery."' R.2027.
The district court believed that Rule 26, read in conjunction with Sleepy Holdings,
required Keystone to disclose in its initial disclosures its damages calculation, and
that if Keystone did not have the documents necessary to make this calculation,
Keystone was required to propound discovery at the beginning of the case to obtain
this information so that it could disclose the damages calculation early in the case.
R.2025-31. The district court faulted Keystone for waiting "just 29 days before fact
discovery was to close" before propounding discovery. R.2027. With these
findings, the court concluded that Keystone failed to provide the damages
disclosure it was obligated to produce under Rule 26, even though Keystone
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provided its damages computation just two weeks after fact discovery closed.
R.2028. Given the fact that the district court previously found that Keystone did
disclose its damages computation through its expert, the district court could only
mean that Keystone did not disclose its damages computation in its initial
disclosures or during fact discovery. R.2027. Thus, Keystone has not misled this
Court as to the meaning of the district court's November 2016 Ruling.
In any event, Defendants ask this Court to interpret Rule 26 in the same
manner that Keystone asserts the district court erroneously interpreted Rule 26.
Aple. Br. at 17. Defendants assert that Keystone should have been required to
"expeditiously conduct discovery" at the beginning of the case so that it could
disclose the damages computation required by Rule 26(a)(1)(C). Defendants'
interpretation does not follow the plain language of Rule 26.
As previously set forth in the Opening Brief, "a computation of any damages

claimed" must be disclosed in a party's initial disclosures, and these disclosures
must be served "by the plaintiff within 14 days after filing of the first answer to the
complaint.'' U.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(A). Rule 26(d)(1) also provides, "A party
shall make disclosures ...based on the information then known or reasonably
available to the party." Rule 26(c)(2) further provides, "a party may not seek to
discovery from any source before that party's initial disclosure obligations are
satisfied."
Defendants want this Court to ignore or strike Rule 26(c)(2), because this
subpart of the Rule does not allow a party to send interrogatories or requests for
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~

production of documents until "that party's initial disclosure obligations are
satisfied." Defendants also want this Court to add another subpart to Rule 26 to
require a plaintiff to "expeditiously" propound or conduct discovery, meaning at
~

the beginning of the case, instead of under the 120, 180 or 210 days provided under
Rule 26(c)(5).
Such an interpretation is unnecessary and Keystone stands by its
interpretation of Rule 26 that it was not required to disclose its damages
computation in its initial disclosures because, under Rule 26(d)(1) or (d)(2),
Keystone's initial disclosures are to be "based on the information then known or
reasonably available to the party", and only Defendants had in their possession the
financial information necessary for Keystone to provide its damages computation.
Moreover, Rule 26(d)(4) acts as a safe harbor, allowing a party to use untimely
disclosures if it "is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure."
Defendants also cite R.OA. General Inc. v. Chung, 2014 UT App 124, in
support of its interpretation of Rule 26 that Keystone was required to disclose
during fact discovery, instead of with its expert, its damages computation. But the
facts in Chung are completely different than the facts here.
In Chung, the plaintiff filed its complaint in 2000 to establish the validity of
a lease. 2014 UT App 124 at ,r3. Summary judgment was granted 2 years later in
plaintiffs behalf. Id. The defendant then filed a third-party complaint in 2005
against a title company. Id. at 1}4. After five years of no action on the third-party
complaint, the title company moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Id. The
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court did not dismiss the case and a scheduling order was set with a discovery
deadline of November 30,
2012

2011.

Id. The deadline was then moved to February 29,

and expert disclosures were due on March

16, 2012.

Id. Before the discovery

deadline closed, the defendant/third-party plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and on
November 23, 2011, the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion to be substituted for the
defendant/third-party plaintiff. Id. at ,r5. On February 9,

2012,

the bankruptcy

trustee sold the cause of action to the defendant/third-party plaintiff and his sister.

Id. After the purchase of the cause of action, no steps were taken to extend the
discovery deadlines and the expert disclosures were not timely provided. Id. at ,I6.
Ultimately, the expert report was filed on May

16, 2012,

two months after the

deadline. Id. The title company moved to strike the expert report as untimely, and
the court granted the motion to strike. Id. at ,I7.
On appeal, and under the old Rule 37(h), the Utah Court of Appeals observed
that exclusion was automatic and mandatory unless the sanctioned party can show
the violation of rule 26 was "harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure
to disclose." Chung, 2014 UT App 124, ,i,r10-11. In determining whether the belated
disclosure was harmless, the Court of Appeals cited Welsh v. Hospital Corp. of

Utah,

2010 UT

App

171,

where the Court of Appeals overturned a trial court's

exclusion of an expert report, but the Court of Appeals determined that none of the
circumstances found in Welsh were present in Chung. Id. at ,I,I12-13. The Court of
Appeals found that the third-party plaintiff never moved to extend the deadline for
expert disclosures and that the title company would be prejudiced because it could
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Cw

not depose the experts without reopening discovery, and the expert report relied
~

on sources the title company has been unable to locate and it raised factual issues
that were not previously asserted. Id. at ,r,r13-14. For these reasons, the Court of
Appeals determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
expert report. Id. at 1J16.
This case is nothing like Chung. Keystone timely propounded discovery
within the schedule set by the court and Keystone timely disclosed its expert report.
Moreover, Defendants simultaneously disclosed an expert report and a rebuttal
~

report. Unlike Chung, Defendants cannot articulate any actual harm with Keystone
providing its damages computation through its expert.
This case is more like Welsh in regards to lack of harm. In Welsh, the plaintiff
was left alone on an elevated examination table and fell, resulting in a fractured
skull and subsequent coma.
August
2008,

2006,

2010

UT App 171, ,r 2. A scheduling order was set in

but it was extended a few times by stipulation and in September

the parties stipulated to extend discovery a third time. Id. at ,r3. The trial

court initially denied the extension, but then granted the extension and warned the
case would be dismissed if it did not move forward. Id. A few days before expert
reports were due, plaintiffs moved for another extension because it obtained new
counsel and because defendants had not made its employees available for
depositions. Id. at ,r4. On the date the expert reports were due, defendants moved
for summary judgment asserting no experts were timely designated. Id. at ,r5.
While these motions were pending, plaintiffs submitted their expert designations.
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Id. at ,I6. A few days later, the court clerk made an entry on the docket and granted
plaintiffs' motion to enlarge time. Id. at ,r7. Plaintiffs then submitted a proposed
order extending their expert deadlines to January 9, 2009, and plaintiffs submitted
their expert reports on January 9,

2009.

Id. However, on January 22,

2009,

the

trial court entered an order denying the motion for enlargement, and also excluded
plaintiffs' expert reports stating they were untimely. Id. at ,rs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that plaintiffs offered reasons for the
extension, including the appearance of new counsel and because the defendants
had been uncooperative in discovery. Id. at ,r13. Both sides had requested
extensions, and plaintiffs did not ignore the last scheduling order but moved to
extend it. Id. at ,r,r13-14. The Court of Appeals also observed that the defendants
did not assert the extension would result in prejudice. Id. at ,I16. The Court of
Appeals observed that any prejudice in this case "is minimized where the opposing
party has time to depose those witnesses, designate rebuttal witnesses, and
prepare for trial." Id. The Court of Appeals found that while the defendants "will
suffer no prejudice if the [plaintiffs'] experts are allowed to testify at trial, the
prejudice to the [plaintiffs] if their experts are excluded is potentially devastating.

Id. at ,r17. The Court of Appeals ultimately determined that the trial court abused
its discretion in excluding the expert reports, concluding that although the case
was nearly three years old with four scheduling orders, both sides contributed to
the delays, the plaintiffs believed the extension had been granted, the plaintiffs
submitted their expert reports which they believed were timely, and the defendants
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<zl)

were not harmed as a result of the short delay by plaintiffs designating and
providing their expert reports. Id. at 119.
Like Welsh, there is no harm in this case considering that Defendants
already obtained their own expert report to calculate Keystone's interest in Inside
and Defendants obtained a rebuttal expert report "to opine on and rebut
Keystone's claims." R.2911. Like Welsh, Keystone does not believe it violated Rule
26, and even if its damages computation was untimely, Defendants have suffered
no harm. And like Welsh, the harm to Keystone in believing it was appropriate
under the circumstances to provide its damages calculation through its expert is
devastating if the district court's ruling is not reversed.
Keystone asserts the district court abused its discretion in excluding its
~

damages and respectfully requests the Court to reverse the district court's
November 2016 Ruling.

D.

Keystone had good cause to
computation in its expert report.

disclose its

damages

Defendants assert that Keystone was already consulting with an expert to
calculate its damages as of October 14, 2015, the date Keystone sent its letter to
Defendants. Aple. Br. at 22. This assertion is incorrect and not supported by the
record.
Keystone did not state in is October 2015 letter that it had retained an expert.
R.2055. Rather, Keystone stated "we are in the process of obtaining some expert
assistance .... " R.2055. Contrary to Defendants' assertion otherwise, Keystone was

~
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not able to consult with an expert in October 2015 because Defendants had taken
Johansson's livelihood from him and refused to pay him the commissions and
profits owed under the Operating Agreement. R.923;988;1252;1332;1350;
1625;2926. Keystone's lack of resources was also no mere "incident to litigation,"

as suggested by Defendants, but a carefully carried out plan by Defendants to
"bury" Johansson and deprive Keystone of its rights as a member of Inside. R.910;285;1252;1274;1314;1666;1783-4;1786.

Defendants further assert that Keystone lacked good cause in disclosing its
damages computation through its expert because Defendants finally disclosed its
QuickBooks by May 2, 2016, and waited until June 15, 2016 to disclose its
computation. Aple. Br. at 22, 24. Defendants raise this argument for the first time
on appeal, but in any event, considering that Keystone met all deadlines set by the
court, Keystone believed it had good cause to disclose its damages computation
through its expert given that Defendants waited until May 2, 2016 before
producing Inside's QuickBooks, which was beyond the deadline required by the
Rules.
Defendants also assert the "jury is out (so to speak) on whether Keystone
ever disclosed a computation of 'damages' regarding the value of its interest in
Inside. Aple. Br. at 24. This argument lacks merit. Both experts provided a range
as to the value of Keystone's interest in Inside, and Defendants never filed a Rule
702

motion to exclude Keystone's expert. Defendants did have the opportunity to

file a 702 motion to exclude Keystone's expert, because dates for the jury trial were
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set to determine Keystone's remaining claims and to determine Inside's expulsion
counterclaim.

R.2229.

Defendants admitted that Keystone's expert would still

testify at trial regarding the value of Keystone's interest in Inside, and Defendants
never moved to limit or exclude this testimony. R.2244. Thus, any attempt by
Defendants to now cast doubt as to the validity of Keystone's damages computation
is without merit when Defendants never raised the issue below.
Keystone had good cause to provide its damages computation when it did,
and Keystone disclosed a valid damages computation, the validity of which
Defendants never challenged below.
E.

Keystone is entitled to an equitable buy-out of its 25%
interest in Inside based on Defendants' wrongful conduct.

Defendants assert in a footnote on page 20 of its brief that Keystone has
never shown it is legally entitled to a buy-out of its

25%

interest in Inside, and

Defendants further assert that Keystone is not legally entitled to a buy-out because
the old LLC Act only provided only for expulsion and not a buy-out.
The district court did not address this issue below, but Keystone did assert
below that the district court had authority to order an equitable buy-out of
Keystone's 25% interest in Inside based on Defendants oppressive acts. R.1840-

In response to Keystone's motion for summary judgment, which the district

court did not decide, Defendants asserted that in OLP v. Burningham,

2009

UT

75, 225 P.3d 177, this Court held that the Utah LLC Act preempts common law
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claims, such as breach of fiduciary duty that a manager of a limited liability
company owes to its members. R.1838. Keystone set forth that breach of fiduciary
duty claims are not preempted by the Utah LLC Act. R.1839. Defendants now
acknowledge that breach of fiduciary duty claims are retained under the LLC Act,
and Keystone brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty. R.16-7; see also Aple. Br. at 20.
Keystone further set forth that in Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 2009 UT
App 137, 210 P.3d 977, the damages for breach of fiduciary duty can be in equity,
and other "measures of damages can apply to a breach of fiduciary action
depending on the particular fiduciary relationship involved." R.1840. Keystone
used these cases to show that under the circumstances, because Defendants acted
to extinguish Keystone's membership interest and relationship with Inside, the
appropriate relief was an equitable buy-out of Keystone's interest in Inside.
R.1840-1.

In any event, this issue is not ripe for decision as it was not addressed by the
district court below.

II.

BECAUSE DEFENDANTS ADMITTED BELOW THAT THE 197PAGE SPREADSHEET RELIABLY CALCULATED KEYSTONE'S
UNPAID COMMISSIONS, DEFENDANTS ARE LEFT WITH NO
CHOICE BUT TO REQUEST WILLIAMS v. ANDERSON BE
OVERRULED

In an attempt to confuse the very document Defendants created to track
Keystone's new and renewal business, thereby allowing Jonathan to ensure
Keystone was properly paid its 90% commission split, Defendants assert there are
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too many variables in the 197-page spreadsheet to know whether this was the
correct calculation of Keystone's unpaid commissions owed under the Operating
Agreement, and that the district court correctly distinguished this case from
t:,,

w

Williams v. Anderson, 2017 UT App 91,

400

P.3d 1071. Aple. Br. at 26-30. These

assertions lack merit.
Defendants list some codes found on the spreadsheet in an effort to show
that the spreadsheet is difficult to understand and that it is unclear how these codes
affect the commissions owed to Keystone. Aple. Br. at 29-30. But Defendants
ignore the fact that they created this spreadsheet to track and pay Keystone's 90%
commission split as required by the Operating Agreement. R.2858. Defendants
also ignore the fact that the expert's calculations of Keystone's unpaid commissions
~

match exactly through April 2015, and the portion from May 2015 through
February 2016 also match (the only discrepancy is that the expert report goes
through March 2016 while the spreadsheet stops at February 2016). R.261829;2627-824;2826;2913;3378. Defendants ignore Johansson's uncontroverted
declaration identifying what these codes mean and Johansson's uncontroverted
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declaration stating the spreadsheet accurately tracked its commissions. 1
R.2913;2926-7. Defendants arguments regarding the meaning of the codes are just
that, arguments. They are not supported by any of Defendants' testimony and
Defendants' arguments are uncorroborated and lack record support.
Defendants' arguments also ignore their own explicit admission in their
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider Ruling and Order Due to
New Case Law, that the "Spreadsheet computes Keystone's commission, after April
20, 2015." R.2858. Defendants also ignore their own explicit admission before the
district court that the 197-page spreadsheet is "the spreadsheet maintained by
Inside Insurance calculating commission" and "[t]his spreadsheet reflects a history
of how commissions were allocated to Keystone" and that the spreadsheet is
reliable. R.3208;3211-2.
Given these admissions, Defendants ultimately ask this Court to overturn

Williams, asserting it "applies Rule 26 in an analytically unsound way." Aple. Br.
at 30. Notably, counsel for Defendants also represented the appellees in Williams.
Defendants ultimately assert that "the Court of Appeals' analysis goes to a

The term "NBS" does mean new business, but a word search of the spreadsheet
shows that the so-called new business written after Defendants' terminated
Keystone's relationship with Inside are actually prior clients brought to Inside
from Johansson. "PCH" is a policy change, but again, these are customers brought
to Inside by Johansson. "STL" is an installment, but this does not change the fact
that these customers were brought to Inside by Johansson. And all cancellations,
as clearly shown in the spreadsheet, do in fact reduce the commissions paid to
Keystone. R.2913;29266-7. Thus, Inside properly listed all of Keystone's new and
renewal business written by or brought over by Johansson in the 197-page
spreadsheet.
1
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determination of harmlessness, not to the sufficiency of the computation itself."
Aple. Br. at 31. Defendants assert that the plaintiff in Williams never disclosed an
actual computation, so it never complied with Rule 26(a)(1)(C), and that failure in
and of itself requires exclusion of the plaintiffs damages. Aple. Br. at 31-34. Thus,
Defendants believe the "harmless" and "good cause" provisions of Rule 26(d)(4)
should never apply if the plaintiff does not disclose an actual computation during
fact discovery.
It appears that Defendants ask this Court to ignore Rule 26(d)(4) because
the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that Keystone did not
show good cause and that Defendants' were prejudiced by Keystone's timing of its
disclosures. Keystone asserts to the only chance Defendants have to prevail on
GiJil

appeal is for this Court to ignore Rule 26(d)(4).
There is no need to rewrite Rule 26 and Defendants' argument that the Court
should ignore Rule 26(d)(4) and overrule Williams should not be followed.

III.

~

BOTH THE DISTRICT COURT AND DEFENDANTS IGNORE THE
FACT THAT THE NEW LLC ACT PROVIDES THAT KEYSTONE
SHOULD NOT COMPETE WITH INSIDE

Defendants assert Keystone did not suffer legal prejudice by the district
court's dismissal of the expulsion counterclaim because (1) Keystone resisted the
expulsion counterclaim; (2) Keystone still maintains all its rights as a member of
Inside; and (3) Defendants may not pursue the claim again as it was dismissed with
prejudice. Aple. Br. at 36-37. These assertions are not supported by the record and

~

lack merit.
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Keystone informed the district court it was prepared to ask the jury to expel
Keystone as a member of Inside, because that was the only way Keystone was going
to be paid its 25% interest in Inside at trial. Remember, Defendants admitted that
Keystone's expert was entitled to testify at trial because of Defendants' expulsion
counterclaim, and Keystone fought the dismissal of Defendants' expulsion
counterclaim so that its expert would testify at trial and so that Defendants would
have to purchase Keystone's interest in Inside. R.2244.
Defendants also have extinguished Keystone's rights as a member of Inside
because Defendants refuse to pay Keystone its commission and profits as defined
and required under the Operating Agreement and Keystone no longer invites
Keystone to its member meetings. R.923;988;1252;1821;2903. The only thing
Keystone receives now as a member of Inside is a K-1 form, which requires
Keystone to pay taxes on money it never receives. R.3146.
And Keystone did suffer legal harm by the dismissal of Defendants'
counterclaim because the new LLC Act does not allow Keystone to compete with
Inside and it is no longer reasonably practicable for Keystone to continue as a
member of Inside based on Defendants' misconduct. R.3260; see also Utah Code
§

48-3a-409(b). The district court should have allowed Keystone to pursue the

counterclaim for expulsion because it is not reasonably practicable for Keystone to
continue as a member of Inside and it has not been since all Defendants acted to
terminate Keystone's relationship with Inside.
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In addition, Keystone is concerned that it may be subject to another lawsuit
by Defendants for competing against Inside. Keystone continues to compete,
which could be the basis of a new cause of action.
Notably, Defendants did not dispute Keystone's alternative request to
reverse the district court's denial of attorney's fees for Inside's belated motion to
dismiss counterclaims. If this Court provides no other relief to Keystone, this Court
should reverse the district court's denial of attorney's fees and remand the matter
for an appropriate award for Keystone's fees.
CONCLUSION

Keystone respectfully requests the Court reverse the district court's rulings
and orders that exclude evidence of its damages, and then reverse the court's grant
of Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, and remand the matter back
to the court to determine Keystone's motion for summary judgment.
In the alternative, Keystone respectfully asks the Court to reverse the court's
denial of the motion to reconsider, and allow Keystone to proceed on its surviving
claims on its damages for unpaid commissions owed pursuant to the Operating
Agreement.
In the alternative to the requests above, Keystone respectfully asks this
Court to reverse the district court's grant of Inside's motion to dismiss, and allow
Keystone to proceed on Inside's expulsion counterclaim. Or in the alternative,
Keystone respectfully asks this Court to reverse the court's denial of attorney's fees
under Inside's motion to dismiss counterclaims, and order the court to assess as a
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sanction, an appropriate award for Keystone's fees and costs for having to continue
the litigation after the November 2016 Ruling.
Respectfully submitted on January 16, 2019.
FILLMORE SPENCER,
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